I. INTRODUCTION In California v. Hodari D., 1 the United States Supreme Court held that a police pursuit of a fleeing suspect, no matter how threatening, does not amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. 2 Under the Court's analysis, the Fourth Amendment does not become relevant until the suspect submits or is physically touched by the officer. 3 Consequently, evidence a suspect discards during pursuit is not subject to exclusion at trial as the fruit of a Fourth Amendment seizure. 4 Upon surveying the Hodari D. opinions, this Note concludes that the Court's decision calls into question the continuing validity of the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring improper police behavior. This Note points out the distinction and contradiction in logic between Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Hodari D.
and the Court's earlier opinions governing Fourth Amendment seizures of persons. Further, this Note delineates the window of opportunity the Court's decision has opened to harrassing police behavior.
II. BACKGROUND

A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." ' 5 The ba-.
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prives [those provisions] of half their efficacy, and leads to a gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. "' 3 In addition to evidence directly obtained from an illegal search or seizure, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to evidence indirectly, or derivatively, obtained from such invasions.' 4 Writing for the Court in Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, Justice Holmes stated, "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all....
[T]he knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."' 5 Once the primary illegality is established, the exclusionary rule will apply to suppress all evidence obtained as "fruit of th[is] poisonous tree." 16 13 Id. at 635. The Court later repudiated this position in Olmstead v. New York, stating: Justice Bradley in the Boyd case ... said that the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment were to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest of liberty. But that can not justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight. 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (the Court found that using a wiretap to listen in on telephone conversations was neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment).
Forty years later, however, the Court renounced the Olmstead "narrow view," finding it substantially eroded by the Court's subsequent decisions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
For the continuing validity of this view post-Hodari D., see infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
14 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (The government could not make use of information obtained during an unlawful search in order to subpoena from the victims the very documents illegally uncovered); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (Not only were unlawfully intercepted telephone messages inadmissible, but also the prosecution was not allowed to make use of the information so obtained).
The exclusionary rule has no application, however, where "the Government learned of the evidence 'from an independent source,' or the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (citing Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392; and Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). The exclusionary rule also is inapplicable where the government would have, without the illegality, ultimately or inevitably discovered the evidence. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) .
15 Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392. 16 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (citing Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). "['ihe exclusionary sanction applies to any 'fruits' of a constitutional violation-whether such evidence be tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention." United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (citations omitted).
Application of the exclusionary rule thus requires both discovery of a Fourth Amendment violation and determination of the time at which the violation occurred.' 7 Police activity which does not amount to a "search" or "seizure," or is not "unreasonable," is unaffected by the exclusionary rule.' 8 Moreover, evidence discovered prior to a "search" or "seizure" does not come within the purview of the rule.
19
B.
THE 210-11 (1979) . Either "probable cause" or consent was required to take a person into custody. Id. "Probable cause" existed if the facts and circumstances before the officer were "such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that an offense has been committed." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924). The "probable cause" requirement also applied to searches. Terry, 392 U.S. at 37.
In order to get around this justification requirement police argued that a legal distinction should be made between an investigatory "stop" and an "arrest" ("seizure of the person"), and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of a crime. Id. at 10. Police argued that they should be allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with criminal activity. Id. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, they should have the power to "frisk" him for weapons. Id.
22 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210-11. The constitutionality of the "stop and frisk" was at issue in Terry. A police officer observed a group of men he thought intended to rob a store. He approached the men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked the men their names. When further questioning failed to dispel his suspicions, the officer grabbed hold of the defendants and, searching them for weapons, found they were carrying guns. 392 U.S. at 6-7.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence so discovered as the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the "stop" was an arrest, made without probable cause. The prosecution countered by arguing that
The Court refused to recognize a "rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the Fourth Amendment. ' 23 In the Court's view "the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.
'2 4
The Court acknowledged that there were limits to its analysis, however. 2 5 The Court stated, "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons." '2 6 "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 2 7 the officer did not "arrest" the men until after he discovered the weapons. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the Supreme Court upheld the denial. Id. at 7-8. The Court found that the stop and frisk was a search and seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but that it was justified by the officer's "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity was afoot. Id. at 21, 31. 23 Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. 24 Id-at 17 n.15. The Court reasoned, "Focusing the inquiry squarely on the dangers and demands of the particular situation... seems more likely to produce rules which are intelligible to police and the public alike than requiring the officer in the heat of an unfolding encounter on the street to make ajudgment as to [whether his conduct meets a technical definition of 'search,' or 'seizure']." Id "'Search' and 'seizure' are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search.'" Id. at 19.
In determining whether a seizure or search is "unreasonable" the inquiry is a dual one-"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id at 20-2 1. In balancing the need to search and seize against the intrusion the procedure entailed in the present case, the Court concluded, where "a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger, the policeman was justified in conducting a limited pat down, or 'frisk' for weapons." l at 27-30. 25 Id. at 21 ("The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances."). Justice Stewart set forth some examples of police conduct which might indicate a "seizure" under this test: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id. at 554.
30 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (Mendenhall test not met; posting agents near exits of workplace should not have given respondents, who were otherwise free to continue working and move about, reason to believe that they would be detained if they refused to respond to questioning); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983) (Mendenhall test met; Royer was unlawfully seized when police officers, who had possession of his plane ticket, identification and luggage, told him they suspected him of drug trafficking and asked him to accompany them to an interrogation room).
Before the Mendenhall test was adopted as the standard to be applied, the Court decided Reid v. Georgia, a case factually similar to Hodari D. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). In Reid, a DEA agent noticed two men walking through an airport concourse who met the profile of drug couriers. When the men left the terminal, the agent approached them, identified himself, and asked them to show him their airline ticket stubs and identification, which they did. The agent thought the men appeared nervous during the encounter. The agent asked the men if they would agree to return to the terminal and consent to a search of their persons and luggage. One nodded his head, and the other said "yeah, okay." As the three of them entered the terminal, however, one of the men began to run and, before he was apprehended, abandoned his shoulder bag, which contained cocaine. Id. at 439.
The Court concluded that the facts before the agent were "simply too slender a reed to support the seizure in this case. Applying the Mendenhall test, the Court found that the police conduct in question was not a Fourth Amendment seizure, reasoning that it "would not have communicated to a reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent's freedom of movement." 3 5 The Court refused to adopt a bright line rule that a police pursuit "is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. '3 6 Instead, the Court adhered to its "traditional contextual approach" of assessing the coercive effect of police conduct, under all the circumstances. McColgin and Jerry Pertoso of the Oakland Police Department's Narcotics Task Force were on patrol, travelling westbound on Foothill Boulevard in an unmarked brown Dodge. 3 8 They were dressed in street clothes but wearing bluejackets with "police" embossed on the front and back. 3 9 Both officers were familiar with this area because it was reputedly "an area with high narcotic activity." 40 The officers had participated in narcotics arrests in this area before.
1
As the officers turned south from Foothill onto 63rd, they saw four or five young black males standing around a red compact car 33 
Id.
34 kd 35 Id at 573-74. 36 IL at 572. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia in concurrence, would have adopted the negative perspective. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated, "whether or not the officer's conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 37 Id. at 573. Expressing his approval of the Court's focus on the coercive effect of police conduct, rather than the reaction of the suspect, Professor Wayne LaFave stated:
The "free to leave" concept, in other words, has nothing to do with a particular suspect's choice to flee rather than submit or with his assessment of the probability of successful flight. Were it otherwise, police would be encouraged to utilize a very threatening but sufficiently slow chase as an evidence-gathering technique whenever they lack even the reasonable suspicion needed for a Tery stop. which was parked along the curb. 4 2 The youths were approximately forty yards away. 4 3 Although the officers did not recognize any of the individuals, they believed they had interrupted some kind of narcotic activity. 44 However, neither officer saw any money or drugs being exchanged.
45
When the youths saw the officers' car approaching, they apparently panicked and took flight. 4 6 Hodari 4 7 and one companion ran west through an alley to the rear of an abandoned house. 48 The others fled south. 4 9 The red car also departed south, at a high rate of speed. 50 Officer McColgin drove the patrol car to the curb where the red car had been parked. 5 ' Officer Pertoso left the car to give chase on foot, while McColgin remained in the car and continued south on 63rd. 52 The officers intended to stop the youths and find out what their purpose was for being in the area.
53
When Pertoso left the car, all of the individuals were out of sight. 5 4 Pertoso ran to cut them off. 55 He went back north on 63rd, then west on Foothill, and turned south on 62nd Avenue. 5 6 Hodari, meanwhile, emerged from the alley onto 62nd and ran north. 57 Hodari was looking over his shoulder as he ran, as if to see if someone was following him. 5 8 When he turned and saw Pertoso, Hodari looked startled. 59 They were approximately eleven feet apart.
60
At this point, "in an underhand scooping motion" Hodari discarded a single loose rock, alongside a house. 6 1 A moment later, Pertoso tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and radioed for assist- [Vol. 82 ance. 62 Upon searching Hodari, Pertoso found $130 in cash and a pager. 63 Laboratory analysis determined that the rock Hodari discarded was crack cocaine.64
In the juvenile proceeding brought against him, Hodari moved to suppress the evideiice relating to the cocaine, as the fruit of an unlawful seizure of his person. 6 5 The court denied the motion without opinion. 66 The California Court of Appeal reversed. 6 7 The court found that Hodari had been "seized" when he saw Officer Pertoso running towards him, 68 that this seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 69 and that the evidence of the cocaine was the fruit of the illegal seizure. 70 The court thus held that Hodari's motion was improperly denied at trial. The Court of Appeal reasoned that Pertoso's action was "reasonably perceived" as an intrusion upon Hodari's freedom of movement and as "a maneuver intended to block or 'otherwise control the direction or speed' " of Hodari's movement, and therefore was a Fourth Amendment seizure. 73 The court rejected the State's contention that "by its citation of 62 The court reasoned that if the statement of those justices "refer[red] to a requirement of physical restraint, it would be contrary to many years of Supreme Court precedent stating that no physical restraint is necessary to constitute a detention."77 Even if physical seizure were required, the court concluded, the confrontation between Hodari and Officer Pertoso was tantamount to a physical seizure. The court reasoned that " [Hodari] , who was running down the sidewalk, had his physical freedom of movement sufficiently blocked by the presence of a police officer, wearing a jacket marked 'police' who was eleven feet away and running towards him."
The California Supreme Court denied the State's application for review. 79 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 8 0 74 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the defendant was under surveillance as a result of an informant's tip. Officers saw the defendant hand an accomplice a quart bottle, at which point an "alarm" was given, and the two men fled. An officer pursued, and the two men dropped bottles, which the officers recognized as containing illegal whiskey. The Court of Appeal distinguished Hester:
It appears from these facts that the officers in Hester had at least a reasonable suspicion, having lawfully witnessed the transaction with the bottles, which would have justified a detention prior to defendant's flight. The case has no application to illegal detentions, nor does it purport to define what constitutes a detention, but merely states that there was no seizure when the officers inspected the bottles. "[o] nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.") (emphasis supplied)).
The Court of Appeal also cited California and federal cases which held that "giving chase 'in a manner designed to overtake and detain or encourage the individual to give up his flight is a detention. ' The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California Court of Appeal. 8 ' Writing for the majority, 8 2 Justice Scalia concluded that although the police pursuit may have constituted a "show of authority" enjoining Hodari to stop, Hodari was not "seized" until physically apprehended, because he did not submit to that injunction. 83 Thus, the Court held that evidence abandoned during the pursuit was not the fruit of a Fourth Amendment seizure, and Hodari's motion to suppress this evidence was properly denied at trial. The majority based its conclusion on the dictionary definition and common law usage of the word "seizure." 8 5 The Court stated that "[firom the time of the founding to the present, the word 'seizure' has meant a 'taking possession.' "186 Further, "[flor most purposes at common law, the word connoted not merely grasping or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it within physical control." 8 7 Where, as here, the arrester did not actually bring his object within physical control, therefore, the Court concluded that there was no seizure. 88 As a policy matter, the Court reasoned that because street purnia, conceded that the officer did not have a "reasonable suspicion" to seize Hodari when the pursuit began. Id. at 1549 n.1. The order granting certiorari is published at lII S. Ct. 38 (1991 The majority did not decide whether the police had "reasonable suspicion" to stop Hodari when the pursuit began, choosing instead to rely on the State's concession that they did not. Id. at 1549 n.l. The majority stated however, "That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense." Id.
(citing Proverbs 28:1, "The wicked flee when no man pursueth"). 88 Id. at 1550 (the word seizure "does not remotely apply ... to the prospect of a policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee.").
suits always place the public at some risk, compliance with police orders to stop should be encouraged. 8 9 Moreover, the Court argued that its decision would not alter police expectations. 90 Since police do not attempt to stop suspects expecting them to get away, the Court explained, "it fully suffices to apply the exclusionary rule to their genuine successful seizures."91
The majority acknowledged the "principle" that all common law arrests are seizures, 9 2 but rejected suggestion that Officer Pertoso's "uncomplied-with show of authority" was a common law arrest. 9 3 The Court explained that in order to constitute an arrest at common law, the arrestee either had to submit to, or be physically touched by, the person making the arrest. 9 4 Without either submission or touching, however, there could be no arrest and thus no Fourth Amendment seizure. 95 Because Hodari did not submit when confronted by the officer, and because there was no physical contact between the officer and Hodari during the chase, the Court concluded that the officer did not seize Hodari until he tackled him. 96 Moreover, since "' [a] seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact,' " even if "Pertoso had laid his hands upon Hodari to arrest him," if "Hodari had bro- A common law arrest was predicated on either "actual" or "constructive" seizure of the arrestee. Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 553 (1924) .
An "actual" seizure, or detention, was accomplished by physical control, taking possession, or laying on of hands, which subjected the arrestee to actual control. Id. Actual seizure also arose from "a surrender or yielding upon demand, to immediately apprehended coercion, rather than resisting it." Id. However, words indicating an arrest without submission by the arrestee were not sufficient. Id. (footnote ommitted).
A "constructive" seizure was accomplished "by merely touching, however slightly, the body of the accused, by the party making the arrest and for that purpose, although he [ The majority replied to the dissent's contention that Supreme Court jurisprudence, beginning with Katz v. United States, 98 had "unequivocally reject[ed] the notion that the common law defines the limits of the term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment." 9 9 The majority explained that it did not assert that under the Fourth Amendment the common law "defines the limits of the term 'seizure'; only that it defines the limits of a seizure of the person."' 10 0 Thus, the majority maintained that its reasoning was consistent with Katz: "What Katz stands for is the proposition that items which could not be subject to seizure at common law (e.g. telephone conversations) can be seized under the Fourth Amendment. That is quite different from saying that what constitutes an arrest (seizure of the person) has changed."'01
The majority rejected the dissent's contention that the Court's decision in Tery v. Ohio 1 0 2 broadened the range of encounters encompassed within the term "seizure."' 1 3 Terry, the Court stated, "unquestionably involved conduct that would constitute a commonlaw seizure; its novelty (if any) was in expanding the acceptablejustification for such a seizure, beyond probable cause."' 0 4
In accordance with this position, the majority interpreted the Mendenhall test to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. 1 0 5 Because this test was worded "only if" rather than "whenever," the majority reasoned that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not automatically result from a police "show of authority" which the subject reasonably believes is intended to restrict her freedom. 1 0 6 Rather, a suspect must submit to this authority in order to be "seized."' 10 7
Finding the Mendenhall test met during pursuit, therefore, was perfectly consistent with finding that seizure did not occur until after 97 2 the Court in that case did not reach the question whether a police pursuit, in and of itself, could constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.' 13 The majority found persuasive the fact that the Court in Brower did not consider the possibility that a seizure could have occurred during the course of a twenty mile police chase.' '4 The majority reasoned that was because that twenty mile "show of authority" did not produce a stop."1 5
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens" 16 strongly objected to the majority's literal interpretation of the language of the Fourth Amendment, stating that it broke sharply from a long line of cases which had rejected this analysis.
1 7 Further, the dissent rejected the majority's reliance on the common law of arrest to define the limits of the seizure of a person. 1 8 Finally, Justice Stevens denounced the majority's focus on the reaction of the citizen, rather than the egregious police conduct, in defining the timing of a seizure. 1 19 The dissent asserted that beginning with Katz v. United States, the Court abandoned a literal reading of the Fourth Amendment.12 0 Instead, the Court adopted a position of applying the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment to "all evils that are like and equivalent to Moreover, the dissent argued, the majority's "novel conclusion" that actual control is required for a seizure of a person makes the Court's discussions of whether the Mendenhall test was met in cases where no actual control was imposed seriously misleading.
6
The dissent acknowledged that the officer's attempt to take Hodari into custody was not a common law arrest. 12 7 The dissent 121 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting)). 122 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353-54). 123 Id at 1555 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). 124 Id at 1555 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Teny, 392 U.S. at 19). In further support of his position that a seizure of a person who refuses to submit to a show of authority requires something less than a physical touching, Justice Stevens cited United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984):
While the concept of a "seizure" of property is not much discussed in our cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the "seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement. (citations omitted). 125 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1555 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
126 Id. at 1557 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) ). The dissent also pointed out that the majority's focus on the suspect's reaction as opposed to the policeman's conduct, was the exact argument that was rejected by the Court in Chesternut:
Petitioner argues that the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in response to the police's show of authority. Thus, petitioner would have us rule that a lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual. Id. at 1558 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1980)). The Court in Chesternut decided to adhere to its "traditional contextual approach" in determining whether a seizure had occurred. Id at 1558 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573).
127 Id. at 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that if the officer had succeeded in touching Hodari before he dropped the rock (assuming the touching precipi-
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pointed out, however, that such an attempt was unlawful at common law.
1 28 The dissent noted the irony "in the fact that the Court's own justification for its result is its analysis of the rules of the common law of arrest that antedated our decisions in Katz and Terry. Yet, even in those days the common law provided the citizen with protection against an attempt to make an unlawful arrest."' 29 Justice Stevens condemned the majority's decision to remove from scrutiny the interval of time between the officer's show of authority and complete submission by the citizen.'
30 During this interval, Justice Stevens explained, evidence could be discovered which would make a seizure, initiated unreasonably, reasonable.' 3 ' Thus, police would " 'be encouraged to utilize a very threatening but sufficiently slow chase as an evidence-gathering technique whenever they lack even the reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry stop.' " 132 The dissent argued that the ends the Court sought to achieve in denying suppression of the evidence in this case would have been better served by enlarging the scope of reasonable justification, rather than narrowing the definition of a seizure.' 3 3 Placing police conduct beyond scrutiny, the dissent argued, contradicts the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and Fourth Amendment prohibitions, to deter improper police behavior.' gle between two factions of the Supreme Court. 3 6 One group, including Justices Scalia and Kennedy, has been intimating its stance on the issue presented in Hodari D. for several years.' 3 7 Until now, their position has been relegated to dicta and separate opinions.' 3 8
In Hodari D., however, their position not only prevailed, but prevailed handily.' 3 9 Writing for a seven member majority, Justice Scalia concluded that a police "show of authority" which is unheeded by a suspect does not amount to a seizure of the person for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
0
The Court thus refined its analysis of Teny v. Ohio and its progeny. 14 1 There remain, under these cases, two categories of Fourth Amendment seizures: those based upon physical force and those based on an official show of authority. 14 2 Under Justice Scalia's approach in Hodari D., however, the Court limited the reach of the show of authority category. 143 An official show of authority, which an individual reasonably believes is intended to restrict her freedom of movement, and which meets the Mendenhall test, 144 does not amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes unless and until that individual submits.
14 5
The Court justified this position by appealing to the "principle," apparently first enunciated here, that the common law of arrest defines the limits of the seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. 14 6 By so doing, however, the Court expanded the physical force category of Fourth Amendment seizures.' 4 7 A common law arrest, and now a Fourth Amendment seizure, results from 136 See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (opinion by ScaliaJ.) ("Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires intentional acquisition of physical control."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is at least plausible to say that whether or not the officer's conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate the Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect."); compare with Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572-73 (opinion by Blackmun, J.) (Court refused to adopt a rule that "a lack of particularized suspicion would not poison police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual.").
137 See supra note 136. 
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physical contact, however slight, between the person arresting and the person arrested, for the purpose of the arrest.
1 48 Thus while control over a subject is required for a show of authority seizure, it is not required for a physical force seizure. The outcomes of Brower and Hodari, however, are unchanged under either analysis. The police officer exercised control over Hodari when he tackled him.' 5 3 The police made physical contact with Brower when his car collided with the roadblock they set up to stop him.
15 4 The decision in Brower did not turn on the question of physical control. 155 The question before the Court in Brower concerned the relationship between police activity and the termination of a subject's movement, that is necessary to constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.' 56 The County of Inyo argued that the police intended to stop the defendant only by show of authority, by pursuit and by setting up a roadblock in his path.
15 7 The defendant's crashing into the roadblock, the County argued, was an accidental effect of otherwise lawful police activity and thus was not a Fourth Amendment seizure.'1 5 8
After surveying the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that a seizure occurs whenever a person is "stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result."' 59 The subjective intentions of the police were therefore irrelevant.' 60 At common law, an arrest occurred whenever police made physical contact with a suspect for the purpose of arresting him.' 6 1 Therefore, since a common law arrest resulted when the defendant collided with the roadblock, Brower could have been decided by simply "appealing to the principle that all common law arrests are seizures."' 162 The Court's discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment was "at best, seriously misleading."' 16 3
Necessary to sustain the Court's conclusion that the common law of arrest defines the limits of Fourth Amendment seizures, is the premise that the Mendenhall test was meant as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a show of authority seizure. 1 64 For, if meeting the Mendenhall test were all that was required for a Fourth Amendment seizure in these instances (i.e. submission was not also required), then the seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment would be a broader notion than the common law arrest.
165
The Court found the existence of this premise exemplified by Brower and Michigan v. Chesternut. 166 The Court found significant the fact that it was not discussed in Brower whether a Fourth Amendment seizure could have occurred during the course of a twenty mile police chase.' 6 7 The Court reasoned that was because that "show of authority did not produce a stop.' ' 168 The Court's emphasis on Brower is inappropriate, how-ever. Brower was a civil rights case, in which damages were sought for an unreasonable seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. 6 9 The "unreasonableness" was not the chase of Brower, who was fleeing police in a stolen car, but rather the erection of a police roadblock around a blind comer, and then shining a light in Brower's face so he could not see the roadblock in time to stop.
170
The Court also found significant its perception that the question of whether a police pursuit could constitute a seizure was not reached in Chesternut.
17 1 As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, however, the Court in Chesternut rejected the proposition that a police pursuit can never constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. 17 2 In finding that there was no seizure in Chesternut, the Court relied on the fact that the police officers did not harass the defendant, not that the defendant did not submit, which would have ended the matter without discussion under the "necessary, but not sufficient" approach.
173
The most troubling aspect of the decision in Hodari D., however, is the Court's conclusion that its decision will have no effect on police behavior. 1 74 The Court erroneously concluded that "unlawful [police] orders [to "stop"] will not be deterred, [] by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed....
[I]t fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine successful seizures."'1 75 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated "we must presume that only a few of those orders will be without adequate basis" and that "policemen do not command 'Stop!' expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping to be outrun."' 17 6
The Court did not base its presumptions on a belief in the good faith of policemen. The Court previously rejected "good faith" as a justification for declining to apply the exclusionary rule. 177 Because police are engaged in "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 169 Brower, 489 U.S. at 594. 170 
Id.
171 See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572-73 ("Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties and determining that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did not amount to a seizure."). The Court offered no explanation or justification for its presumptions and thus presumed too much. By presuming that the police only make a few orders to stop without adequate basis, the Court presumed that its decision reached only a limited number of cases. By presuming that police cannot be influenced to make orders which they expect will be disobeyed (which would seem a logical result of not applying the exclusionary rule), 1 8 0 the Court presumed that its decision will have no effect on police behavior. By therefore presuming, hysteron proteron, the conclusion it set out to prove, the Court argued circuitously. The Court began and ended its argument with the bald assertion that the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule would not be served by applying the rule to deliberate, but unsuccessful, attempts to violate the Fourth Amendment.
A better reasoned approach to the question of whether to apply the exclusionary rule centers on the extent to which the remedial objectives of the rule would be served.'1 8 Because of the substantial social costs of excluding highly probative and "inherently trustworthy" evidence, "the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' 8 2
Without perfect information regarding police-citizen encounters, not all violations of the Fourth Amendment will be discovered and sanctioned.
8 3 Where the probability of benefit 8 4 outweighs the probability of sanction, police will have an incentive to attempt to violate the Fourth Amendment. 435, 440-44 (1990) . 184 Of course, evidence of guilt will not always be revealed when police violate the Fourth Amendment.
185 This follows the "standard model of deterrence." See Shavell, supra note 183, at 436-37. Of course, the mere fact that police have an incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment, does not mean that they will, in actuality, do so. Indeed, empirical studies have questioned the effect the exclusionary rule has on police behavior. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) tion unsuccessful attempts will further reduce the probability of sanction and add to this incentive. 186 The Court in Hodari D. argued, however, that because police do not attempt to stop suspects with an eye toward failure, this added incentive will not result in more attempts, and more harrassing police behavior.' 8 7 Because expectations are ultimately tied to probabilities, however, this logic fails close inspection.188
If the probability of sanction declines, the probability of benefit will outweigh the probability of sanction more often than before, and police will engage in more attempts to violate the Fourth Amendment. 18 9 Further, because an attempt alone may result in the subject abandoning incriminating evidence, police may make attempts with the intention of failure. 190 Where the police are able to control, or effectively predict the suspect's response, these attempts REV. 665, 667 (1970)); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 1.2 at 25-28. However, the Supreme Court has retained the exclusionary rule for the sole purpose of deterring improper police behavior. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984) . Ignoring this purpose casts doubt upon the rule's legitimacy. The discussion that follows assumes that the Court is not abandoning, sub silentio, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
186 Shavell, supra note 183, at 436. The amount of the reduction will depend on the probability that an unsuccessful attempt will be discovered and sanctioned. Id. at 447. If the probability is very low, the reduction may be minimal. Id.
187 California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991) ("Unlawful orders will not be deterred... by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule, those of them that are not obeyed. Since policemen do not command 'Stop!' expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping to be outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures."). 189 See Shavell, supra note 183, at 436 (punishing attempts increases deterrence by raising the probability of imposing sanctions). Because the magnitudes of benefit (admission of the evidence discovered) and sanction (suppression of the evidence discovered) are equal in this situation, the probabilities of benefit and sanction will determine whether the police attempt to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 439-40.
Following the Court's statement regarding the good faith of policemen, supra note 177, this argument disregards conscience as a motivating factor in police activity. Rather, the argument assumes, as does any argument of deterrence, the presence of rational actors. Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Ciminology: The Path Not Taken, 81J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 655 (1990) . Rational actors are informed by the probable consequences of their actions and seek to maximize benefit and minimize burden. Id. at 654.
190 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 3 LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.2 at 61).
Police would not actually intend to fail, but rather to "strategically abandon" the attempt if it did not yield evidence of guilt. See Shavell, supra note 183, at 446 (strategic abandonment occurs when a person desists from proceeding with an attempt upon noticing that the chances of being discovered and sanctioned now outweigh the chances of benefit).
768
[Vol. 82 may become a common investigative technique.
19 ' The police may begin such a hypothetical encounter by approaching an individual in a public place.' 92 If the individual stops in response to police inquiries, he has consented to the encounter. 1 93 Complying with a request does not constitute a common law arrest (Fourth Amendment seizure). 9 4 Evidence obtained as the fruit of a consensual encounter is not subject to the exclusionary rule. 9 5 Only when police behavior rises to the level of an official "show of authority" does submission complete a seizure rather than indicate consent. 
